Photos of the ship in Algeciras Bay
confirm the 17 degree list.
Very disappointing Gibraltar report.
Basically, just blames the Captain for picking
a rendevous point too close to shore given the onshore wind.
(The point was actually picked by the agent.)
No drafts. (World have been about 12 m.)
No tank arrangement.
No loading pattern. No description of the damage other than
"Holed in shell plating starboard side in way of permanent ballast tanks."
which sound like the damage was
on the side shell or right on the bilge radius.
This casualty was widely trumpeted
as a demonstration of the value of double hull,
but the case is (and was) easily overstated.
The key here is that the ship did not strand.
This is good because she hit almost exactly at high tide (0150 +0.89 m).
She apparently drifted broadside onto a ledge
pushed by the easterly BF4 winds
and possibly a westerly set in the current.
The master was able to get her off by powering southward,
possibly extending the damage aft.
before the flooding into the double bottom
planted her solidly on the bottom.
We can be sure that the damage was both very low
and very close (if not on) to the side shell.
In such a situation, there is a very good chance
double sides would have been just as effective as a double hull
without as much risk of flooding stranding the ship.
The Samothraki, a very early double hull,
apparently had an unusual cargo tank arrangement:
6 center tanks with a total cubic of 39,354 m3,
flanked by 2 cargo tanks on either side,
with a total cubic of 14,232 m3.
(Is she were a more modern double hull
she probably would have been a one-across
ship with only 5 or 6 cargo tanks.)
If she had been a Marpol single hull,
she probably would have been a 2x5 ship
with two ballast tanks on each side.
If the three starboard cargo tanks
and the two ballast tanks had been holed,
she would have taken on at least as much
list and draft as the DH ship,
but as long as she did not strand,
(and she would have flooded more slowly than the DB ship)
this would have aided hydrostatic ballance.
On top of that, oil would have flowed
from the 3 cargo tanks into the 2 ballast tanks.
(See Diamond Grace, Exxon Valdez.)
In such a situation, it is highly unlikely
she would have lost a meter from the 3 cargo tanks
(about 1,500 m3) to the sea,
and quite possible that hydrostatic balance
would have kept essentially all the cargo on board.
The actual number is easily calculable
if we had the necessary data;
but as usual the regulatory system has failed
to make this data public.
As of 2009-12-15, GISIS has nothing on this casualty.