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Precis File
SHIP NAME: Almudaina KEY: NUM. ENTRIES: 3
source MAREUD
type A
volume
material
dead 7
link

In a flash fire while repairing a tanker at Keppel Shipyard. The fire, the yard's worst ever accident, broke out on Saturday at 1300 hrs in the No 3 starboard tank of the Portuguese-registered 132,000 dwt tanker Almudaina, under repair at the yard. The blast was so powerful that one of the workers was thrown out of the tanker and onto the deck, his body ablaze. Despite attempts to save him, he died an hour later. The bodies of six other workers were recovered from inside the cargo tank, a nd according to local reports they had been burned beyond recognition. Five of the deceased workers were Indian nationals and the other two Malaysians. All seven workers were subcontracted from Wah Soon Marine. Nelson Yeo, executive director of Keppel Shipyard, said: "We are saddened by this incident and loss of lives. We grieve with the families on the loss of their loved ones. We will do our best to work with Wah Soon Marine to help the families during this period of bereavements."


source Singapore Ministry of Manpower
type A
volume
material
dead 7
link

The Ministry of Manpower (MOM) has completed its investigations into the fire which had occurred onboard the vessel Almudaina on 29 May 2004, at the shipbuilding and repairing yard of Keppel Shipyard Ltd (KSL). MOM's investigations revealed that a flash fire had occurred inside the vessel's No. 3 Starboard Cargo Oil Tank (No. 3S COT) and killed seven workers.

On the day of the accident, seven workers were carrying out hot-work to replace some structural steel brackets inside the No. 3S COT. At about 1pm, sludge at the tank's bottom at the aft of the No. 3S COT was ignited by sparks or molten metal from the hot-work being carried out above. The sludge was residue from the cargo previously held in the tank. It should have been cleared before hot-work was carried out. The fire spread from the aft of the tank and subsequently led to a flash fire inside the tank.

Prior to the accident, on 24 May 2004, cleaning to remove sludge was carried out in No. 3S COT at areas where hot-work was to be carried out. The area to be cleaned included the entire bottom of the tank.

On 27 May 2004, an application for a hot-work permit was submitted by the company's Steel Foreman after initial cleaning was completed. This was followed by a hot-work assessment conducted by the Safety Assessor in No. 3S COT. During the inspection, the Safety Assessor instructed further cleaning to be done. Under the Permit-To-Work system in the Factories (Shipbuilding and Ship-repairing) Regulations, the Safety Assessor is required to make a physical inspection of the site of the intended work and its surrounding areas to ensure that there are no hazards or dangers present. He should only endorse the hot-work permit application after he is satisfied with the results of his inspection. However, in this case, the Safety Assessor endorsed the hot-work permit without re-inspecting No. 3S COT to ensure that the areas that required further cleaning had in fact been cleaned. The hot-work permit was then submitted to and approved by the Project Manager.

Consequently, the residual sludge was ignited by sparks or molten metal from hot-work being carried out. The fire spread from the aft of the tank and subsequently led to a flash fire inside the tank, killing seven people.


source CTX
type C
volume
material
dead 7
link

GISIS has nothing, presumably because ship was in repair yard. Ships was double hull, so the cargo tanks should have been very easy to clean.