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Precis File
SHIP NAME: Tasman Spirit KEY: NUM. ENTRIES: 5
source LMIU
type D
volume Y
material
dead
link

Grounded mouth of Keamari Channel, Karachi, in strong winds 27 Jul 2003 Tanker ar 31 Jul to tranship cargo Salvors on scene 07 Aug Reported 13 Aug broken in two, major pollution Forepart removed 21 Feb 2004, aftpart 06 Mar.


source PMNA
type D
volume 40000T
material
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According to a report prepared by the Pakistan Merchant Navy Officers Association and released on August 18, the Oil Tanker M V Tasman Spirit ran aground in Karachi harbour's channel due to corruption and negligence of top Karachi Port Trust officials, many of whom, it said, are non-technical people

The report, which has been sent to General Pervez Musharraf, says that the channel has not been "dredged honestly" and does not have the declared depth and the oil tanker was not called into the channel at the time of high tide According to the report, the depth of the entire channel should be 12.2 metres - as had been declared by the KPT - but the actual depth was around 9.5 metres at the extremities of the channel due to improper dredging.

The MV Tasman Spirit, carrying around 70,000 tonnes of crude oil from a Gulf port for local refinery, ran aground on July 27, 2003 Its tanks ruptured, leading to leakage of over 40,000 tonnes of crude oil into the sea, seriously contaminating the marine environment and the national economy According to the report, the KPT had declared the depth of the channel as 12.2 metres, whereas the channel is not actually that deep Furthermore, at peak high tide there is around 2.8 metres swell which should make the total depth in the channel at around 15 metres The report says that if the channel was as deep as it had been declared, and if the M.V Tasman Spirit, which had a draught of 11.89 metres, had been called into the channel at the time of high tide, it could not have run aground The report stated that the high tide on that day (July 27, 2003) started at 10:33 and the vessel should have been brought into the channel between 11:00 and 11:30 to take full advantage of the peak high tide. However, this was not done so that a few smaller ships could enter before the oil tanker and by the time MV Tasman Spirit was called in, the tide was beginning to recede The wind effect, due to the large tanker superstructure, an ebbing tide, south westerly winds, heavy swell, long length and deep draught of the tanker, heavy torque on the rudder while turning, squat factor, improper depth of channel owing to poor dredging, all contributed to push the vessel to less deep area towards the extremities of the channel and the vessel grounded at 12:57 hours between the buoy pair number 6 and 7, about 50 metres from S7 and S6 The report says that no tug accompanied the vessel when it entered the channel and the first tug, Sohrab, reached the grounded ship at 13:03 in the pushing position on the starboard bow when the vessel had already grounded The deputy conservator boarded the grounded ship at around 13:15 and a couple of other tugs were also called in and they, by applying the push and pull movements, tried to bring the vessel to the centre of the channel It was a wrong action and resulted in the rupturing of fuel tanks No 1 and No 2 of the tanker Oil started leaking from the tanker, which was not declared by the KPT.

The Tasman Spirit, which was a 24 year old single hull tanker, was not fitted with the emergency towing arrangements, required under the Safety of Life at Sea Regulation (15 - 1) saying that all tankers over 20,000 tons dead weight must be fitted with emergency towing arrangements

The report added that one of the main reasons of this catastrophe was the appointment of pseudo-professionals to the management of KPT and improper dredging of the channel The association chief Shaikh Mohammad Iqbal said that if technical qualified people had been running the affairs at the top of KPT, they would have handled the situation by shifting the oil to other tanks and should have waited for the next high tide, rather than using the push and pull method on a single hull old ship that was loaded with heavy liquid cargo He urged the authorities to institute a high level inquiry into the dredging operation in the KPT channel and another inquiry to find out why, or who for what reason, allowed the smaller ships' entry to the port during high tide while the tanker was told to wait He demanded that technically qualified people be put in charge of the affairs of the KPT and further urged that the ownership of the vessel be ascertained


source Oils Spill Response Ltd, Wayne O'Brien
type D
volume
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link http://www.spillcon.com/2004/papers/O'BRIEN.pdf

In July 2003, the 87,584 dwt crude oil tanker Tasman Spirit ran aground whilst entering Karachi Harbour, Pakistan. The vessel grounded approximately one mile offshore to the east of the S7 buoy whilst making its final turn into the port. A pilot was onboard the vessel at the time of the grounding and weather conditions were squally with a heavy swell running. The vessel was held fast by the bow section on a bottom of sand and mud, with the stern section remaining afloat. An operation to refloat the vessel using six tugs operated by both the Karachi Port Trust and the Pakistan Navy was unsuccessful. The grounding occured at the end of the SW monsoon season and the vessel was exposed to a four meter swell hitting the vessel beam on.

This report gives the following time line: 2003-07-27|Vsl runs aground, small release occurs 2003-07-28|Tugs attempt to refloat vessel 2003-07-30|2000 tons released from fwd section in attempt to refloat 2003-07-31|96,000 dwt Endeavor II arrives for lightering 2003-08-01|Global Alliance put on stand-by 2003-08-07|Lightering begins using 8000 dwt Fair Jolly 2003-08-10|Vsl condition critical, ITOPF travel to Pakistan 2003-08-12|Global Alliance mobilised 2003-08-13|Vessel breaks in half, releasing abt 20,000 m3. This report estimated the total loss of oil at 27,000 m3. (Itopf says 30,000 tons Crude was Iranian Light)


source CEDRE
type L
volume 28000T
material
dead 0
link http://www.le-cedre.fr/en/spill/tasman_spirit/tasman_spirit.php


source CTX
type D
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The ship was loaded on an 11.9m draft. To get into this channel requires a hard left turn ending up in the ship going NNE into the port, broadside to the SW monsoon. According to secondary sources, the Pakistani Mercantile Marine issued a report which said "that the engine of the ship failed to respond and that the rudder did not work". The ship was owned by Polembros, a very poor operator, registed in Malta, and classed NK, and it grounded on the outside of the turn, so it is indeed possible that the ship did not respond properly, but CTX have no concrete evidence of that. Twin screw might have helped.

IMO FSI puts location at 24.47.4N 66.59.35E.

Smit site talking about wreck removal mentions "strong currents".

Gard News Issue 177, Feb/Apr 2005 claims Subsequent survey has revealed that the dredged channel was in some places 2.8 meters shallower than the charted depth. But this source fails to say if the shallow spots are where the ship grounded. This Gard News article's thrust is to finger shoreside screw ups as a primary problem.

Owners of course blame the Pilot and the port. The failure to refloat the ship is weird. Once they were aground they could have ballasted down to the next high tide. Slow lightering probably was the worst way to go. The ship would have been bouncing on the bottom in the swell. Salvor pictures show that the failure was in sag about midships, and the accompanying text says that 90% of the bottom plating was damaged or gone.

Gard News Issue 177, Feb/Apr 2005 claims Even though it was apparent quite early that the vessel would have to be lightened considerably, permission to allow a large tanker to anchor in the approach channel for STS transfer was denied by the port authorities.

Not clear what the impact of double hull would have been. The initial spill would have been less, and she would bounced around less. But it would have taken more, possibly a lot more, lightering to get her off on the next high tide. Need penetration data, and then to do the calculations.

Another option would have been to jettison enough cargo to float her on the next high tide. Need penetration data, and calculations, but quite possibly would have been under 10,000 tons. Hard to see anybody having the guts to do this.

Cedre says ship had 67,000 tons of Iranian crude on-board and indicates that 13,000 tons were recovered by August 13th and another 25,000 tons by August 18th, altho the wording is quite ambiguous. This sort of jibes with Cedre's 28,000 ton spillage and ITOPF estimate of 30,000 T.