The oil tanker industry has lost its way. The twin pillars of tanker industry regulation had been:
The Classification Society system was always deeply flawed, combining as it did dependence on the regulatee for fee income and potential competition among the Societies for that income. However, a combination of a strong tendency among the owners to stick with their national classification society and, in the best societies, a long tradition of technical professionalism managed to keep the class rules at a slowly declining but still marginally satisfactory level through the mid 1970's. Since then the combination of inter-class competition and the ability of the ship yards to rewrite the rules via the down-ratchet has resulted in a further decline in the class rules to imprudent levels. See Devanney and Kennedy, The Down Ratchet and the Deterioration of Tanker Newbuilding Standards
Almost every measure of tanker strength and reliability are down at least 15% from the marginally satisfactory ships of the mid-70's. The shipyards are now producing ships that are so flimsy and unreliable that they are willing to guarantee them -- a very limited guarantee -- for only a year. The classification societies are now run by businessmen who are far more interested in "growing the business" than in maintaining industry standards. Within the societies, unreasonable and inflexible traditionalists who do not get with the program are passed over and eventually leave in disgust. The class tradition of tough, disinterested surveyor has pretty much disappeared.
Third parties can sense that something is wrong. Generally, this perception is in response to a high profile oil spill. However, third parties cannot know what the real problems are, especially in the emotional, media dominated aftermath of a big spill. Much less do they have the ability to develop efficient solutions to those problems. The results has been regulation that is both ineffective and terribly inefficient. We have mandated pollution prevention measures that have resulted in more pollution than would have occurred without the regulation while consuming an enormous amount of resources This is the opposite of conservation. We have overlooked -- and in certain cases, outlawed -- alternatives that would have reduced pollution considerably while consuming little or no additional resources. We have erected paperwork barriers to new entrants protecting inefficient and incompetent owners and managers. The basic problem is that the regulation is being written in an emotional and easily manipulated atmosphere by politicians who understand neither the problem nor the possible solutions. (This is not just a tanker industry problem. This problem of efficient regulation of highly technical industries is endemic to modern society.)
The situation would be much improved if there existed an organization to which these third parties -- and the industry itself -- could turn, which meets the following criteria:
One crucial key to better tankers is better newbuilding contracts and specifications. The CTX will develop document templates representing CTX's recommended practice and make them freely available. This will include a newbuilding guarantee and a newbuilding specification.
The CTX will develop programming to facilitate tanker design and operation. The first such product will be CTX_MATE a combined on-board loading/salvage/spill_reduction program. This will be followed by a spill visualization program which will graphically display all the different things that happens when a tank is breached. ALL CTX programming will be Open Source and organized into re-usable set of inter-related tools. .
Conventional reports studies will be a secondary priority at CTX compared with the above products. However, from time to time the CTX will undertake and publish such studies. An example is the Downratchet Paper.
All CTX documentation and software will be distributed under either the Gnu Free Documentation License (GFDL) or the Gnu Public License (GPL) to assure that all the CTX products are available and open to all for both use and third party scrutiny, and stay available to all.
Click here for a list of the currently proposed projects.
The CTX is largely a virtual organization. For obvious reasons, the CTX cannot accept contributions from oil companies, ship owners or ship owner related organizations, ship yards, classification societies, nor environmental groups. This covers the great bulk of all organizations that have an active, on-going interest in tank ship design and operation. And even governmental grants will have to be scrutinized closely to ensure that they cannot be construed as affecting CTX's objectivity. In other words the CTX will be financially constrained by design.
We hope to overcome this handicap by using the Web and volunteers. The CTX will serve as a sort of glue to link together people all over the world who have something to contribute to tanker design and operation. Our model will be that used in creating Open Source software.
Right now the CTX is basically a one-man operation headed by Jack Devanney. And it shows. The Tanker Casualty Database is woefully incomplete especially with respect to cause, and undoubtedly filled with unintended inaccuracies. The other proposed projects are at this point all vaporware. The visual quality of the website is laughably amateurish. But we have to start somewhere. People who believe they have something to contribute to any of the CTX's proposed projects are encouraged to contact the CTX email@example.com.